

The certification body of TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH  
hereby awards this certificate to the company

**Skaitmeninio Sertifikavimo Centras**  
**Jogailos 8 - 16**  
**01116 Vilnius, Lithuania**

to confirm that its certification service

**SSC GDL NH CA**

fulfils all requirements defined in the technical specification

**ETSI TS 102 042 V2.4.1 (2013-02),  
policy EVCP+.**

The appendix to the certificate is part of the certificate and  
consists of 6 pages.

The certificate is valid only in conjunction with the respective  
evaluation report until 2016-06-30.



**Voluntary Validation**  
© TÜViT - Member of TÜV NORD GROUP

16  
Certificate-Registration-No.:  
TUVIT-CA6729.13

Essen, 2013-06-28

Dr. Christoph Sutter  
Head of Certification Body

**TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH**  
Member of TÜV NORD GROUP  
Langemarckstr. 20  
45141 Essen, Germany  
www.tuvit.de

  
Deutscher  
Akkreditierungs  
Rat  
DGA-ZE-014/99

**Certificate**

## **Certification System**

**TÜV**<sup>®</sup>

The certification body of TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is accredited by “DAkkS Deutsche Akkreditierungsstelle GmbH” according to DIN EN 45011 for the scope IT security product certification. The certification body performs its certification on the basis of the following accredited product certification system:

- German document: “Zertifizierungsschema für Zertifikate des akkreditierten Bereichs der Zertifizierungsstelle der TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH”, version 1.2 as of 2011-01-28, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH

## **Evaluation Report**

- “Evaluation Report – Initial Certification – ETSI TS 102 042, SSC GDL NH CA”, version 2.1 as of 2013-06-26, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH

## **Evaluation Requirements**

The evaluation requirements are defined in the technical specification ETSI TS 102 042:

- ETSI TS 102 042 V2.4.1 (2013-02): “Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy Requirements for certification authorities issuing public key certificates”, Version 2.4.1, 2013-02, European Telecommunications Standards Institute

The applicable ETSI Certificate Policy is:

- EVCP+: Extended Validation Certificate Policy requiring a secure user device

## Evaluation Target

The target of evaluation is characterized by the certificate information of the inspected certification service:

### SSC GDL NH CA:

<b>Root CA (Issuer of CA certificate): CN = SSC GDL CA Root B</b>	
<b>Name of CA (as in certificate)</b>	<b>serial number of certificate</b>
CN = SSC GDL NH CA	61 2b 54 f4 00 00 00 00 00 02

together with the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of the operator:

- “Certification Practice Statement SSC GDL CA”, version 4.6 as of 2013-06-21, Skaitmeninio Sertifikavimo Centras

## Evaluation Result

- The target of evaluation fulfills all applicable evaluation requirements.
- The certification requirements defined in the certification system are fulfilled.
- The Key Ceremony for SSC GDL CA Root B was performed in accordance to the requirements of ETSI TS 102 042, policy EVCP+.

## Summary of the Evaluation Requirements

TÜV®

The ETSI specification ETSI TS 102 042 contains the following requirements:

### 1 Certification Practice Statement (CPS)

The CA shall have a statement of the practices and procedures.

### 2 Public key infrastructure - Key management life cycle

The CA shall ensure that CA keys are generated in controlled circumstances.

The CA shall ensure that CA private keys remain confidential and maintain their integrity.

The CA shall ensure that the integrity and authenticity of the CA signature verification (public) key and any associated parameters are maintained during its distribution to relying parties.

If the subject's key is to be used for electronic signatures with the meaning of Directive 1999/93/EC, then the CA shall not hold the subject's private signing keys in a way which provides a backup decryption capability (commonly called key escrow).

If a copy of the subject's key is kept by the CA then the CA shall ensure that the private key is kept secret and only made available to appropriately authorized persons.

The CA shall ensure that CA private signing keys are not used inappropriately.

The CA shall ensure that CA private signing keys are not used beyond the end of their life cycle.

In case of NCP, the CA shall ensure the security of cryptographic device throughout its lifecycle.

The CA shall ensure that any subject keys, that it generates, are generated securely and the secrecy of the subject's private key is assured.

In case of NCP+, the CA shall ensure that if it issues to the subject secure user device this is carried out securely.

In case of an EV code signing certificate instructions of appendix H, item 10 of the document "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates", version 1.3, CA/Browser Forum, shall be followed.

### **3 Public key infrastructure - Certificate Management life cycle**

The CA shall ensure that evidence of subscriber's and subject's identification and accuracy of their names and associated data are either properly examined as part of the defined service or, where applicable, concluded through examination of attestations from appropriate and authorized sources, and that certificate requests are accurate, authorized and complete according to the collected evidence or attestation.

The CA shall ensure that requests for certificates issued to a subject who has previously been registered with the same CA are complete, accurate and duly authorized. This includes certificate renewals, rekey following revocation or prior to expiration, or update due to change to the subject's attributes.

The CA shall ensure that it issues certificates securely to maintain their authenticity.

The CA shall ensure that the terms and conditions are made available to subscribers and relying parties.

The CA shall ensure that certificates are made available as necessary to subscribers, subjects and relying parties.

The CA shall ensure that certificates are revoked in a timely manner based on authorized and validated certificate revocation requests.

#### **4 CA management and operation**

Requirements from document “Network and Certificate System Security Requirements”, CA/Browser Forum, apply.

The CA shall ensure that administrative and management procedures are applied which are adequate and correspond to recognized standards.

The CA shall ensure that its assets and information receive an appropriate level of protection.

The CA shall ensure that personnel and hiring practices enhance and support the trustworthiness of the CA's operations.

The CA shall ensure that physical access to critical services is controlled and physical risks to its assets minimized.

The CA shall ensure that the CA systems are secure and correctly operated, with minimal risk of failure.

The CA shall ensure that CA system access is limited to properly authorized individuals.

The CA shall use trustworthy systems and products that are protected against modification.

The CA shall ensure in the event of a disaster, including compromise of the CA's private signing key, operations are restored as soon as possible.

The CA shall ensure that potential disruptions to subscribers and relying parties are minimized as a result of the cessation of the CA's services, and ensure continued maintenance of records required to provide evidence of certification for the purposes of legal proceedings.

The CA shall ensure compliance with legal requirements.

The CA shall ensure that all relevant information concerning a certificate is recorded for an appropriate period of time, in particular for the purpose of providing evidence of certification for the purposes of legal proceedings.

## **5 Organizational**

The CA shall ensure that its organization is reliable.

## **6 Additional requirements**

The CA shall provide different options to allow third parties to check and test their certificates.

In case of PTC-BR, requirements from appendix C of document "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates", CA/Browser Forum, apply.

The CA shall disclose all cross certificates that identify the CA as the subject.

In case of PTC-BR, requirements from section 8.4 of document "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates", CA/Browser Forum, apply.

## Scope of the Amendment

This amendment as of 2014-07-04 supplements the certificate TUVIT-CA6729.13 as of 2013-06-28 because of the conducted surveillance audit.

## Certification System

The certification body of TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is accredited by “DAkKS Deutsche Akkreditierungsstelle GmbH” according to DIN EN 45011 for the scope IT security product certification. The certification body performs its certification on the basis of the following accredited product certification system:

- German document: “Zertifizierungsschema für Zertifikate des akkreditierten Bereichs der Zertifizierungsstelle der TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH”, version 1.2 as of 2011-01-28, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH

## Evaluation Report

- “Evaluation Report - Surveillance On-Site Inspection - ETSI TS 102 042, SSC GDL EV CA”, Version 1.0 as of 2014-06-17, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH

## Evaluation Requirements

The evaluation requirements are defined in the technical specification ETSI TS 102 042:

- ETSI TS 102 042 V2.4.1 (2013-02): “Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy Requirements for certification authorities issuing public key certificates”, Version 2.4.1, 2013-02, European Telecommunications Standards Institute

The applicable ETSI Certificate Policy is:

- EVCP+: Extended Validation Certificate Policy requiring a secure user device



## Evaluation Target

The target of evaluation is characterized by the certificate information of the inspected certification service:

### SSC GDL NH CA:

<b>Issuer of CA certificate (Root CA or intermediate CA):</b> <b>CN = SSC GDL CA Root B</b> <b>Certificate Serial Number: 3e 8c 4f bc e4 29 83 82 4d 84 55 8e d5 35 80 cf</b>	
<b>Name of CA (as in certificate)</b>	<b>serial number of certificate</b>
CN = SSC GDL EV CA	12 41 45 6e 00 00 00 00 00 07

together with the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of the operator:

- “Certification Practice Statement SSC GDL CA”, version 4.6 as of 2013-06-21, Skaitmeninio Sertifikavimo Centras

## Evaluation Result

- The target of evaluation fulfills all applicable evaluation requirements.
- The certification requirements defined in the certification system are fulfilled.

## Summary of the Evaluation Requirements

The ETSI specification ETSI TS 102 042 contains the following requirements:

### 1 Certification Practice Statement (CPS)

The CA shall have a statement of the practices and procedures.

## **2 Public key infrastructure – Key management life cycle**

**TÜV**<sup>®</sup>

The CA shall ensure that CA keys are generated in controlled circumstances.

The CA shall ensure that CA private keys remain confidential and maintain their integrity.

The CA shall ensure that the integrity and authenticity of the CA signature verification (public) key and any associated parameters are maintained during its distribution to relying parties.

If the subject's key is to be used for electronic signatures with the meaning of Directive 1999/93/EC, then the CA shall not hold the subject's private signing keys in a way which provides a backup decryption capability (commonly called key escrow).

If a copy of the subject's key is kept by the CA then the CA shall ensure that the private key is kept secret and only made available to appropriately authorized persons.

The CA shall ensure that CA private signing keys are not used inappropriately.

The CA shall ensure that CA private signing keys are not used beyond the end of their life cycle.

In case of NCP, the CA shall ensure the security of cryptographic device throughout its lifecycle.

The CA shall ensure that any subject keys, that it generates, are generated securely and the secrecy of the subject's private key is assured.

In case of NCP+, the CA shall ensure that if it issues to the subject secure user device this is carried out securely.

In case of an EV code signing certificate instructions of appendix H, item 10 of the document “Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates”, version 1.3, CA/Browser Forum, shall be followed.

### **3 Public key infrastructure - Certificate Management life cycle**

The CA shall ensure that evidence of subscriber's and subject's identification and accuracy of their names and associated data are either properly examined as part of the defined service or, where applicable, concluded through examination of attestations from appropriate and authorized sources, and that certificate requests are accurate, authorized and complete according to the collected evidence or attestation.

The CA shall ensure that requests for certificates issued to a subject who has previously been registered with the same CA are complete, accurate and duly authorized. This includes certificate renewals, rekey following revocation or prior to expiration, or update due to change to the subject's attributes.

The CA shall ensure that it issues certificates securely to maintain their authenticity.

The CA shall ensure that the terms and conditions are made available to subscribers and relying parties.

The CA shall ensure that certificates are made available as necessary to subscribers, subjects and relying parties.

The CA shall ensure that certificates are revoked in a timely manner based on authorized and validated certificate revocation requests.

#### **4 CA management and operation**

**TÜV**<sup>®</sup>

Requirements from document “Network and Certificate System Security Requirements”, CA/Browser Forum, apply.

The CA shall ensure that administrative and management procedures are applied which are adequate and correspond to recognized standards.

The CA shall ensure that its assets and information receive an appropriate level of protection.

The CA shall ensure that personnel and hiring practices enhance and support the trustworthiness of the CA's operations.

The CA shall ensure that physical access to critical services is controlled and physical risks to its assets minimized.

The CA shall ensure that the CA systems are secure and correctly operated, with minimal risk of failure.

The CA shall ensure that CA system access is limited to properly authorized individuals.

The CA shall use trustworthy systems and products that are protected against modification.

The CA shall ensure in the event of a disaster, including compromise of the CA's private signing key, operations are restored as soon as possible.

The CA shall ensure that potential disruptions to subscribers and relying parties are minimized as a result of the cessation of the CA's services, and ensure continued maintenance of records required to provide evidence of certification for the purposes of legal proceedings.

The CA shall ensure compliance with legal requirements.

The CA shall ensure that all relevant information concerning a certificate is recorded for an appropriate period of time, in particular for the purpose of providing evidence of certification for the purposes of legal proceedings.

## **5 Organizational**

The CA shall ensure that its organization is reliable.

## **6 Additional requirements**

The CA shall provide different options to allow third parties to check and test their certificates.

In case of PTC-BR, requirements from appendix C of document “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates”, CA/Browser Forum, apply.

The CA shall disclose all cross certificates that identify the CA as the subject.

In case of PTC-BR, requirements from section 8.4 of document “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates”, CA/Browser Forum, apply.

## Scope of the Amendment

This amendment as of 2015-06-30 supplements the certificate TUVIT-CA6729.13 as of 2013-06-28 with the first amendment as of 2014-07-04 because of the conducted surveillance audit.

**TÜV**<sup>®</sup>

## Certification System

The certification body of TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is accredited by “DAkKS Deutsche Akkreditierungsstelle GmbH” according to DIN EN 45011 for the scope IT security product certification. The certification body performs its certification on the basis of the following accredited product certification scheme:

- German document: “Zertifizierungsprogramm (akkreditierter Bereich) der Zertifizierungsstelle der TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH”, version 1.4 as of 2014-11-28, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH

## Evaluation Report

- “Evaluation Report - Surveillance On-Site Inspection - ETSI TS 102 042, SSC GDL EV CA”, version 1.0 as of 2015-06-30, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH

## Evaluation Requirements

The evaluation requirements are defined in the technical specification ETSI TS 102 042:

- ETSI TS 102 042 V2.4.1 (2013-02): “Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy Requirements for certification authorities issuing public key certificates”, Version 2.4.1, 2013-02, European Telecommunications Standards Institute

Additionally the following criteria were considered in the audit:

- “Guidelines for the issuance and management of Extended Validation Certificates”, version 1.3 as of 2010-11-20,

CA/Browser Forum



The applicable ETSI Certificate Policy is:

- EVCP+: Extended Validation Certificate Policy requiring a secure user device

### Evaluation Target

The target of evaluation is characterized by the certificate information of the inspected certification service:

#### SSC GDL NH CA:

<b>Issuer of CA certificate (Root CA or intermediate CA):                  CN = SSC GDL CA Root B                  Certificate Serial Number: 3e 8c 4f bc e4 29 83 82 4d                  84 55 8e d5 35 80 cf</b>	
<b>Name of CA (as in certificate)</b>	<b>serial number of certificate</b>
CN = SSC GDL EV CA	12 41 45 6e 00 00 00 00 00 07

together with the Certificate Policy (CP) of the operator:

- “Certificate Policy SSC GDL CA”, version 4.4 as of 2013-07-12, Skaitmeninio Sertifikavimo Centras

and with the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of the operator:

- “Certification Practice Statement SSC GDL CA”, version 4.7 as of 2014-04-22, Skaitmeninio Sertifikavimo Centras

### Evaluation Result

- The target of evaluation fulfills all applicable evaluation requirements.
- The certification requirements defined in the certification system are fulfilled.

## Summary of the Evaluation Requirements

TÜV<sup>®</sup>

The ETSI specification ETSI TS 102 042 contains the following requirements:

### 1 Certification Practice Statement (CPS)

The CA shall have a statement of the practices and procedures.

### 2 Public key infrastructure - Key management life cycle

The CA shall ensure that CA keys are generated in controlled circumstances.

The CA shall ensure that CA private keys remain confidential and maintain their integrity.

The CA shall ensure that the integrity and authenticity of the CA signature verification (public) key and any associated parameters are maintained during its distribution to relying parties.

If the subject's key is to be used for electronic signatures with the meaning of Directive 1999/93/EC, then the CA shall not hold the subject's private signing keys in a way which provides a backup decryption capability (commonly called key escrow).

If a copy of the subject's key is kept by the CA then the CA shall ensure that the private key is kept secret and only made available to appropriately authorized persons.

The CA shall ensure that CA private signing keys are not used inappropriately.

The CA shall ensure that CA private signing keys are not used beyond the end of their life cycle.



In case of NCP, the CA shall ensure the security of cryptographic device throughout its lifecycle.

The CA shall ensure that any subject keys, that it generates, are generated securely and the secrecy of the subject's private key is assured.

In case of NCP+, the CA shall ensure that if it issues to the subject secure user device this is carried out securely.

In case of an EV code signing certificate instructions of appendix H, item 10 of the document "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates", version 1.3, CA/Browser Forum, shall be followed.

### **3 Public key infrastructure - Certificate Management life cycle**

The CA shall ensure that evidence of subscriber's and subject's identification and accuracy of their names and associated data are either properly examined as part of the defined service or, where applicable, concluded through examination of attestations from appropriate and authorized sources, and that certificate requests are accurate, authorized and complete according to the collected evidence or attestation.

The CA shall ensure that requests for certificates issued to a subject who has previously been registered with the same CA are complete, accurate and duly authorized. This includes certificate renewals, rekey following revocation or prior to expiration, or update due to change to the subject's attributes.

The CA shall ensure that it issues certificates securely to maintain their authenticity.

The CA shall ensure that the terms and conditions are made available to subscribers and relying parties.

The CA shall ensure that certificates are made available as necessary to subscribers, subjects and relying parties.

The CA shall ensure that certificates are revoked in a timely manner based on authorized and validated certificate revocation requests.

#### **4 CA management and operation**

Requirements from document “Network and Certificate System Security Requirements”, CA/Browser Forum, apply.

The CA shall ensure that administrative and management procedures are applied which are adequate and correspond to recognized standards.

The CA shall ensure that its assets and information receive an appropriate level of protection.

The CA shall ensure that personnel and hiring practices enhance and support the trustworthiness of the CA's operations.

The CA shall ensure that physical access to critical services is controlled and physical risks to its assets minimized.

The CA shall ensure that the CA systems are secure and correctly operated, with minimal risk of failure.

The CA shall ensure that CA system access is limited to properly authorized individuals.

The CA shall use trustworthy systems and products that are protected against modification.

The CA shall ensure in the event of a disaster, including compromise of the CA's private signing key, operations are restored as soon as possible.

The CA shall ensure that potential disruptions to subscribers and relying parties are minimized as a result of the cessation of the CA's services, and ensure continued maintenance of records required to provide evidence of certification for the purposes of legal proceedings.

The CA shall ensure compliance with legal requirements.

The CA shall ensure that all relevant information concerning a certificate is recorded for an appropriate period of time, in particular for the purpose of providing evidence of certification for the purposes of legal proceedings.

## **5 Organizational**

The CA shall ensure that its organization is reliable.

## **6 Additional requirements**

The CA shall provide different options to allow third parties to check and test their certificates.

In case of PTC-BR, requirements from appendix C of document "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates", CA/Browser Forum, apply.

The CA shall disclose all cross certificates that identify the CA as the subject.

In case of PTC-BR, requirements from section 8.4 of document "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates", CA/Browser Forum, apply.